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Do citizens have a duty to abstain from voting when they cannot vote well? Jason Brennan has
recently argued that, since citizens have a duty not to engage in harmful activities and bad voting
is a harmful activity, citizens have a duty to abstain from voting badly. In this reply, I argue that
Brennan dismisses the moral disagreements that unavoidably pervade the very idea of bad voting
in a democratic society and provides a de-politicised and incomplete account of what voting badly
means. Without a sound definition of bad voting, Brennan’s argument fails.
Introduction
Political rights, such as suffrage, are Hohfeldian power rights. They give us the
power not only to shape the political, economic and social landscape but also to
change the very structure of rights our fellow citizens have. Persistent worries about
bad voting and the harm it can produce are thus unsurprising, as recent contribu-
tions against compulsory voting in this journal have shown (Lever, 2007; Saunders,
2009). Jason Brennan (2009) has recently taken the debate further by arguing that,
even though all citizens should enjoy equal voting rights, they also have a moral
duty to abstain from exercising such rights when they exercise them badly, in the
sense of voting for harmful and unjust policies without a sufficient moral justifica-
tion for their votes.1
In this article I will argue that Brennan dismisses the moral disagreements that
pervade willy-nilly what counts as a harmful, unjust or morally unjustified exercise
of the right to vote in a democratic society and, accordingly, fails to provide a sound
account of bad voting, without which his argument turns out to be incomplete.
Further, I will argue that such moral disagreements cannot be left aside by appeal-
ing to non-relational moral criteria about good and bad voting because voting is a
device that is only called for when moral disagreements exist. If no disagreement
existed, voting would not be required in the first place.
Bad voting and moral disagreement
Consider first Brennan’s argument, which can be divided into the following
three steps:
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1. Citizens have a duty not to engage in harmful activities when personal cost is low.
2. Voting badly is a harmful activity, while the cost of refraining from voting is low.
3. Citizens should refrain from voting badly.
Assume, for the sake of the argument, that Brennan’s argument is sound and let us
turn in this article to the very idea of bad voting.2 Brennan initially characterises
bad voting as occurring ‘when citizens vote for harmful or unjust policies or for
candidates likely to enact harmful or unjust policies’ (Brennan, 2009, p. 536). The
problem with this definition, as he points out, is that one might be justified in
voting for a decision that only later turns out to be harmful or unjust, for example,
due to the appearance of previously unknown facts. For that reason, Brennan turns
to the more cautionary formulation of bad voting as occurring ‘when a citizen votes
without sufficient reason for harmful or unjust policies or for candidates that are likely
to enact harmful or unjust policies’ (Brennan, 2009, p. 537, emphasis in original).
Hence, citizens vote badly when they vote without sufficient reasons, such reasons
being dependent on the existing level of knowledge. In that case, or so argues
Brennan, citizens have a moral duty to abstain from voting and stay at home.
To illustrate this point, Brennan repeatedly compares voting to surgery. Not every-
one has to be a surgeon or a voter, but once a person decides to be one of these he
or she has the duty to be a good surgeon or vote well. However, the analogy
between voters and surgeons is not as straightforward as it might first appear to be.
Surgery is mainly a technical matter of acquiring and applying a set of skills in order
to achieve certain aims settled in advance. Quite differently, voting is not only about
making technical decisions about which are the best means to achieve certain aims
settled at the outset, but also about the very aims that are to be achieved. In a
nutshell, being a good surgeon is mainly a technical task while voting well is both
a technical and a moral task.3
Brennan is certainly aware of this, for he explicitly includes, among the most
common forms of bad voting, not only voting from ignorance or from epistemic
irrationality and bias, but also from immoral beliefs (e.g. racist beliefs).4 Here again,
what counts as bad voting is what occurs when a citizen votes for a harmful or
unjust policy without ‘a sufficient moral ... justification for their votes’ (Brennan,
2009, p. 538). Now, the obvious question here is about what counts as a sufficient
moral justification, a question that Brennan eludes by saying that he ‘won’t try to
settle the standards for justified belief here. Instead, I leave it to be determined by
the best epistemological theories’ (Brennan, 2009, p. 538). Likewise, regarding
what counts as harmful or unjust policies, he argues that ‘the argument of this
paper is compatible with whatever position on that debate turns out to be correct’
(Brennan, 2009, p. 536 n. 3).
Now, the problem with eluding this question is that it is an unavoidable feature
of democratic societies that citizens do disagree on what the best moral episte-
mological theories are – that is, they disagree on what counts as a sufficient moral
justification. Likewise, regarding what counts as harmful and unjust, no clear-cut
position on that debate is likely to reach a consensus as the correct one. Consider
the case of immigration policies and of what counts as bad voting in this regard.
The open borders policy put forward by many cosmopolitans might be seen as
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extremely harmful for the community from a communitarian point of view,
whereas the closed borders policy proposed by many communitarians might be
seen as equally harmful for the desperate immigrant from a cosmopolitan stand-
point. Likewise, what counts as a sufficient reason to support a closed borders
policy to the former might count as a xenophobic and unjustified one to the
latter and, thus, what counts as voting well to the former might count as obvi-
ously bad voting to the latter. It is thus not possible for Brennan to argue that his
argument is consistent with ‘whatever position turns out to be correct on the
debate’ over what counts as harmful and unjust policies or as a sufficient moral
justification because no position is likely to reach a consensus as the correct one.
Moral disagreements on these issues are the very bread and butter of democratic
politics and the morally unrestricted exercise of the right to vote is the means we
use to make decisions precisely because we acknowledge that such disagreements
are unlikely to disappear. Further, as we shall see below in more detail, it is not
possible to evade such disagreements by appealing to non-relational moral criteria
about what counts as good and bad voting because voting implies the existence
of moral disagreements as a necessary condition. If citizens agreed on what
counts as harmful and unjust policies or as morally unjustified beliefs, voting
would not be required in the first place (except perhaps merely for co-ordination
matters).
Possible objections
Consider now four possible objections. First, it might be objected that moral dis-
agreements on what counts as bad voting do affect bad voting from immoral beliefs
but not (or to a significantly lesser extent) voting from ignorance or inconsistency,
which are much less open to moral disagreements. Granted. To be sure, it is much
easier to settle the issue of what counts as voting from political ignorance or
inconsistency. And, for that very reason, it might well be the case for citizens who,
say, are unaware of the most basic political facts to have a moral duty to abstain
from voting. However, my quarrel in this article is only with bad voting from
immoral beliefs, a concept that is much more elusive and subject to perfectly rea-
sonable moral disagreement in a democratic society.
Second, it might further be objected that, as a matter of fact, citizens in democratic
societies do agree on some minimal moral criteria which, in turn, can be used to
settle the limits of which policies are to be considered harmful or unjust, of which
reasons are to be taken as morally unjustified and, eventually, of which voting
should be counted as bad voting. However, even if that seems often to be the case,
normative criteria that often seem to be undisputed at first sight turn out to be fuzzy
and incomplete when applied to particular circumstances, borderline cases and
unforeseeable contingencies (see Bellamy, 2007; Waldron, 1999). For example, we
all appear to agree that killing is wrong and we would count a vote aimed at
promoting it as bad voting. However, moral disagreements arise willy-nilly regard-
ing what killing means and whether it is always wrong in cases such as abortion,
euthanasia, war, self-defence, capital punishment, the consumption of non-human
animals, and so forth. That we have to vote on these issues shows that we disagree
on them and that (apparently uncontroversial) minimal moral criteria are also
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pervaded by moral disagreements when getting down to particular circumstances
and contingencies, making them unsuitable for settling which voting should be
taken as bad voting.
Third, it might further be objected that, regardless of whether an agreement
exists or is likely to be reached on some minimal moral criteria and their
application, the right to vote necessarily implies a number of core substantive
values – such as mutual respect, equality or autonomy, as Corey Brettschneider
(2007) has claimed – which provide the rationale for this right. It is those values
that make the right to vote worth being enjoyed and exercised, rather than the
other way around. Accordingly, it makes perfect sense to point out that any
exercise of the right to vote that may jeopardise these values or be at odds with
them could easily be counted as bad voting. For example, xenophobic beliefs can
be said to be immoral because they are incompatible with mutual respect and
equality and voting from them (say, to support a closed border policy) can be said
to be bad voting.5 However, even though this is a very powerful argument, moral
disagreements unavoidably pervade not only these values and their application to
particular circumstances and unforeseen contingencies, as demonstrated above,
but also their relationship with the right to vote. Even if universal suffrage
appears to be beyond controversy and disagreement (at least, in well-established
democracies), controversy and disagreement arise again when trying to settle the
values behind it. Hence, while some would agree on the values pointed out by
Brettschneider, others would embrace universal suffrage for completely different
reasons, such as its ability to bring about economic growth or political stability or
to reduce the likelihood of social revolutions breaking out. As Jacques Maritain
(1949, p. 9) liked to tell,
‘at one of the meetings of a UNESCO National Commission where human rights
were being discussed, someone expressed astonishment that certain champions
of violently opposed ideologies had agreed on a list of rights. “Yes”, they said, “we
agree about the rights but on condition that no one asks us why”. That “why” is
where the argument begins’.
Fourth, it might be finally objected that whether or not a consensus on some
moral criteria – either procedure-dependent or substantive – and their application
exists is irrelevant for Brennan’s argument if there is a fact of the matter. If
citizens vote for policies that are in fact harmful and unjust and do so on reasons
that are in fact unjustified, the existence of an agreement on what counts
as harmful and unjust policies and as morally justified reasons – or the lack
thereof – does not really matter. Going back to the example above, if voting for
closed borders policies on the belief that locals should come before aliens is
morally wrong as a matter of moral metaphysics, then it is irrelevant whether
actual citizens recognise it or not. Voting for such policies would be bad voting
regardless of whether they agree on it or not. Put differently, it could be objected
that the existence of moral disagreements is relevant from the point of view of
realist politics, but not from a de-politicised moral standpoint, such as the one
adopted by Brennan.6
To be sure, this is a sensible concern. Consider two possible replies. First, Brennan’s
argument is not only about moral metaphysics, for he explicitly refers to whatever
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position turns out to be correct on the debate over what counts as harmful and unjust
policies (Brennan, 2009, p. 536 n. 3). Now, these are the sorts of debates that are
unavoidably pervaded by moral disagreements. Second, and more importantly,
moral disagreements on what counts as bad voting are not a mere psychological and
contingent political feature that can be left aside by appealing to non-relational
moral criteria about good and bad voting because voting is a device that is only
called for when moral disagreements do exist. If there were no disagreements
(including moral disagreements on what counts as harmful and unjust policies or as
a sufficient moral justification), voting would not be required in the first place.
Accordingly, moral disagreements are not only relevant from the point of view
of realist politics but also for moral theorising, which cannot go on without the
existence of moral disagreements for, unlike other political issues susceptible to
moral scrutiny, voting is a device that is required only if such disagreements exist.
Conclusion
Brennan has forcefully argued that citizens have a moral duty to abstain from
voting badly, in the sense of voting for harmful and unjust policies without a
sufficient moral justification for their votes. However, in a democratic society no
process-independent moral criteria can be referred to in order to settle what counts
as a harmful, unjust or morally unjustified exercise of the right to vote, for voting
is a device that is only called for precisely when citizens disagree on what counts as
harmful, unjust and morally unjustified. When Brennan refers to whatever posi-
tion turns out to be correct on the debate on what counts as harmful and unjust and
as morally unjustified, he is de-politicising the very nature of voting as the device
we use to make decisions in the light of unavoidable moral disagreements and,
what is more important, he is failing to provide a sound account of what bad voting
means, without which his argument turns out to be incomplete.
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Notes
The article was written while I was a visiting research affiliate at the School of Public Policy, University
College London, funded by the University of Barcelona. For discussions on the topic and comments on a
previous version of the article, I am grateful to Guy Aitchison-Cornish, Nina Eschke, Volkan Gul, Maeve
Mckeown and three anonymous referees for Politics.
1 In a more recent paper, Brennan (2011) has further claimed that voting restrictions should be enforced
against those who are not in a position to vote well. However, in this article I only consider the weaker
argument of the first paper.
2 As a referee has suggested, it might be objected that a single vote has almost no impact on the electoral
outcome and thus that voting badly can be said not to be harmful. However, according to Brennan
(2009, p. 540), when there is a collective action problem, as is the case with collectively harmful
activities (such as voting badly), individuals may not have the duty to solve the problem individually
(which can be very costly and often out of their control), but they have the duty not to be part of the
problem nevertheless.
3 To be sure, surgery also has a moral dimension acknowledged in the medical practice in the forms of
the Hippocratic oath or the patient’s ever-present right to opt out. But this dimension is secondary
while in the case of political voting it is essential.
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4 In a similar case for voting abstention, Hanna (2009) includes additional reasons such as the quality
and reliability of the electoral process. I do not consider his argument here though.
5 I am grateful to a referee for raising this point. However, it has to be noted that this is not Brennan’s
argument; he does not elaborate on the possible source of the moral criteria that may be used to settle
what counts as harmful and unjust policies, as unjustified moral beliefs and, thus, as bad voting.
6 I am grateful to a referee for raising this point.
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